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Abstract 
Key Findings: 
• Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the 
perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; 
• Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-
for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) 
criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); 
• High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance 
perceptions; 
• There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence 
employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance 
and turnover intentions; and 
• When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial 
pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention. 
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 Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens 
the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase 
in pay; 
 
 Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention 
in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., 
peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); 
 
 High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for-
performance perceptions;  
 
 There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can 
influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact 
their performance and turnover intentions; and  
 
 When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introduc-
ing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and 
retention. 
Pay secrecy continues to be a contentious issue among scholars and practitioners 
alike, with both theory and empirical evidence regarding the implications of pay se-
crecy remaining equivocal. As noted by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010), signaling theory 
suggests that employers may use pay-for-performance system attributes to signal to 
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employees the objectives that they deem to be of high priority. For example, 
choices made by the employer with regard to pay determination criteria may 
be used to signal to employees that situational constraints are taken into ac-
count. Similarly, choices made with regard to the subjectivity of performance 
assessment may signal to employees an emphasis on recognizing and rewarding 
the employee’s full range of performance, even those not readily measured ob-
jectively. 
 
Drawing from signaling theory, the researchers sought to explore how aspects 
of the broader pay context within which pay communication policies are em-
bedded may condition these effects. Based on the notion that pay secrecy gen-
erates information asymmetries that heighten the uncertainty surrounding em-
ployees’ effort allocation decisions, researchers sought to prove that employees 
seek to glean whatever information they can from the broader pay context.  
 
More specifically, the Cornell team proposed that employees may infer signals 
from pay secrecy itself as well as from two attributes of the pay-for-
performance system — a dominant aspect of the broader pay context in many 
organizations enforcing pay secrecy — in order to reduce uncertainty. Accord-
ingly, a theoretical model was developed specifying that these two pay-for-
performance system attributes, namely pay determination criteria and the sub-
jectivity of performance assessment, condition the pay-for-performance-related 
inferences employees draw from pay secrecy as well as the impact of these in-
ferences on both performance and continuation intentions.  
 
The findings of the study suggest that when implemented under conditions of 
relative pay determination criteria and subjective (vs. objective) assessment, the 
adverse impact of pay secrecy (vs. pay transparency) is unlikely to be limited 
only to task performance. Pay secrecy, when implemented under such condi-
tions, may also take a toll on the ability of the firm to retain its best performers 
(see Figures 3 and 4 on pages 6 and 7, respectively).   
1. Does pay secrecy have a negative impact on employee performance and 
retention when that employee is managed under a pay-for-performance 
Study Questions 
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system?  
 
2. What impact does performance assessment method have on the influence of 
pay secrecy on employee performance and retention? 
 
3. Are high-performing employees more sensitive to the potential effects of pay 
secrecy?  
 
4. Can pay secrecy amplify an employee’s negative perception of other pay sys-
tem attributes?  
The experiment consisted of 280 Israeli undergraduates. All were paid a base sala-
ry of $5.70 an hour to play a computer matching game. Half of the participants 
received information about their bonus pay and the bonus pay of their fellow 
group members in the experiment. The other half received information about 
bonus pay only. That half was requested to not discuss any pay-related issues dur-
ing the experiment. 
 
The research suggests that high-performing participants were more sensitive than 
others when they perceived that there was no link between performance and pay. 
It follows that pay secrecy may hinder a firm's ability to retain top talent.  
 
When students in the pay secrecy group were told they were being paid based on 
how they performed compared to peers, performance and retention went down. 
However, negative effects of pay secrecy on employee performance and retention 
thinned when workers were told that performance was assessed objectively on a 
scale of absolutes, rather than subjectively (see Figure 3 on page 6).   
 
The study suggests that subtle "signals" in the way HR policies are communicat-
ed and put into practice can influence employees' perception of workplace uncer-
tainty and inequity, leading to poorer performance and higher turnover inten-
tions.  
Data 
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impacts individual task performance by increasing the amount of uncer-
tainty surrounding the perceived workplace pay range and by appearing to 
serve as a method of managerial opportunism or deception. 
 
 The negative effects of pay secrecy on employee performance and retention 
are attenuated when performance is assessed objectively rather than subjec-
tively.   
 
 Pay secrecy may hinder a firm’s ability to retain top talent, as high per-
formers seem to be most sensitive to negative pay-for-performance percep-
tions. 
 
 Even if pay secrecy in isolation does not negatively impact employee pay-
for-performance perceptions, it can lead to negative behavioral conse-
quences (i.e., decreased performance and increased turnover intentions) 
when paired with other policies which raise employee concern, namely, 
relative pay determination. Decreased performance and increased turnover, 
for example, can result when pay secrecy is paired with other policies – 
namely, determination of pay based on what others earn – which raise em-
ployee concern. 
 
 Partial pay openness can mitigate effects on employee performance and 
retention. Organizations can also take steps to heighten rater accountabil-
ity to negate the paired impact of subjective assessment and pay secrecy on 
employee behavior.  
 
 
Future studies might examine empirically the extent to which seniority attenu-
ates the negative effects of pay secrecy on pay-for-performance perceptions, 
task performance and retention intentions.  
It may be important to test cross-cultural generalizability of the findings. For 
example, it may be that in cultures characterized by norms and values promot-
The Takeaway 
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ing transparency about pay-related issues, pay secrecy might be more likely to 
signal deceptive intent. In contrast, in cultures in which the disclosure of any 
information related to income or wealth is considered taboo, employees may be 
less likely to infer from pay secrecy malevolent managerial intent.  
Figure 2: Pay secrecy is associated with weak employee pay-for-performance  
perceptions when paired with other policies, which raise employee concern, 
namely, relative (i.e., peer-ranked) pay determination criteria (as opposed to ab-
solute). 
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Figure 3: The positive impact of pay-for-performance perceptions on perfor-
mance is being amplified when performance assessment is objective (as op-
posed to subjective).    
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Figure 4: The positive impact of pay for performance perceptions on retention 
intentions is amplified when performance assessment is objective, particularly 
among high performers. It follows that high-performing participants are more 
sensitive than others when they perceived that there is no link between perfor-
mance and pay, and pay secrecy may hinder a firm's ability to retain top talent. 
Results (cont’d) 
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For the full article in the Academy of Management Journal, go to:  
http://amj.aom.org/content/early/2014/01/13/amj.2012.0937 
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